triangles, and circles in the dust with his finger, yet he is not aware, how he makes all those same figures first upon the corporeal spirits of his brain, from whence, notwithstanding, as from a glass, they are reflected to him, fancy being rightly concluded by Aristotle* to be a weak and obscure sense. There is also another more interior kind of plastic power in the soul (if we may so call it), whereby it is formative of its own cogitations, which itself is not always conscious of; as when, in sleep or dreams, it frames interlocutory discourses betwixt itself and other persons, in a long series, with coherent sense and apt connections, in which oftentimes it seems to be surprised with unexpected answers and repartees, though itself were all the while the poet and inventor of the whole fable. Not only our nictations for the most part when we are awake, but also our nocturnal voiutalions in sleep, are performed with very little or no consciousness. Respiration, or that motion of the diaphragma and other muscles which causes it (there being no sufficient mechanical account of it), may well be concluded to be always a vital motion, though it be not always animal; since no man can affirm, that he is perpetually conscious to himself of that energy of his soul, which does produce it when he is awake, much less when asleep. And, lastly, the Carte-sian[b] attempts to solve the motion of thtf heart mechanically, seem to be abundantly confuted by autopsy and experiment, evincing the systole of the heart to be a muscular constriction, caused

[a] Lib. iii. de Ant ma, cap. Hi. iv. p. 45. s. torn. iL oper. [b] **Vide** Cartes, Ufor. do Homine et <le Formations Foetus, p. it. >. 195. &»